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Objective Computation versus Subjective Computation# 
Nir Fresco1 
 
Abstract. The question ‘What is computation?’ might seem a trivial one to many, but this is far 
from being in consensus in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and even in physics. The lack of 
consensus leads to some interesting, yet contentious, claims, such as that cognition or even the 
universe is computational. Some have argued, though, that computation is a subjective 
phenomenon: whether or not a physical system is computational, and if so, which computation it 
performs, is entirely a matter of an observer choosing to view it as such. According to one view, 
which we dub bold anti-realist pancomputationalism, every physical object (can be said to) 
computes every computer program. According to another, more modest view, some computational 
systems can be ascribed multiple computational descriptions. We argue that the first view is 
misguided, and that the second view need not entail observer-relativity of computation. At least to a 
large extent, computation is an objective phenomenon. Construed as a form of information 
processing, we argue that information-processing considerations determine what type of 
computation takes place in physical systems. 
1. Introduction 
Some maintain that the claim that computation is objective is either false or misguided. For 
example, both Hilary Putnam (1988) and John Searle (1990) have claimed, roughly, that every 
physical object can be described as implementing any number of programs and, hence, as 
computing every Turing-computable function. This claim leads to bold anti-realist 
pancomputationalism1. At least prima facie, it seems that if every physical object can be described 
as computing every Turing-computable function, then the phenomenon of physical computation is 
less interesting in its own right. Nevertheless, a better understanding of what computation is, and in 
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particular digital computation, helps show why some pancomputationalist arguments are wrong and 
that bold pancomputationalism is unfounded. 
The observer-relativity of computation can also supposedly be derived from the less contentious 
view that multiple computational descriptions can be ascribed to a single computational system. For 
example, a basic AND-gate (under its conventional interpretation) could be just as well described as 
an OR-gate (Bishop 2009, p. 228; Shagrir 2001, p. 374; Sprevak 2010, pp. 268–269) (see Table 1). 
Which function does the gate compute then? “[T]here is nothing that decides between the two 
options. No physical, structural, or functional property [would help] decide [… in this matter]” 
(Sprevak 2010, p. 269). “[P]ositing processes and structures is necessary if an explanation is to be a 
computational explanation” (Dietrich 1989, pp. 130–131). Yet, “the precise function of the system-
as-a-whole remains fundamentally observer- relative” (Bishop 2009, p. 228). 
 
Table 1. Truth tables of an AND-gate and an OR-gate “mirroring” one another when logical 0s and 1s are swapped. 
 
Whatever the “correct” account of digital computation is (Copeland 1996; Fresco and Wolf 2014; 
Piccinini 2007; Turing 1936), we argue here that, at least to a large extent, computation is an 
objective phenomenon. Nontrivial computation in memory-based systems is an objective 
phenomenon, whereas the boundaries of objectivity in memoryless system computation are blurry 
as is shown below. It would also seem that the cognitivist should resist the purported observer-
relativity of computation. For if cognition is to be explained computationally, but computational 
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systems require a cognitive observer to determine what computation is performed, then the 
explanation is circular. 
At least two related questions arise in relation to the purported subjectivity of computation and 
they should be addressed separately. The first one is whether computational descriptions are trivial 
or vacuous. The second question, which need not presuppose either bold or weak 
pancomputationalism (i.e., the thesis that every physical object computes at least one Turing-
computable function), is what fixes the computational identity of a computational system. Indeed, 
some physical systems may not compute. But if some computational systems compute more than 
one Turing-computable function, what is the criterion for fixing the “correct” computational 
identity of the system? (cf. Table 1). We argue that the multiplicity of computational descriptions in 
itself does not imply that these descriptions are incompatible or that the computational identity of 
the system concerned is unfixed. Either of these implications would have been problematic for the 
objectivity of computation. 
To ground the discussion, we begin (Section 2) by construing ‘computation’ as a form of 
information (or data) processing, and then reply to an important objection. In Section 3, we present 
the bold anti-realist pancomputational view and argue against it. In Section 4, we discuss the 
‘multiple computational identities’ argument and examine the implications of this argument for 
genuine computational systems. Section 5 concludes the article. 
2. Computation as a Form of Information Processing 
2.1. Nontrivial versus trivial computation 
According to the instructional information processing (IIP) account, nontrivial computation is the 
processing of discrete data in accordance with finite instructional information (possibly) through 
discrete state transitions. Digital computational systems send, receive and process data. Trivial 
computational systems process data, which need not be structured, by way of exercising a single 
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capacity. Nontrivial computational systems, on the other hand, process instructional information 
under the right conditions by way of being capable of systematically processing at least two distinct 
imperative instructions (Fresco and Wolf 2014). 
This characterisation requires some unpacking. First, roughly speaking, a datum is the lack of 
uniformity between at least two distinct variables. Data are not defined in the alphanumeric sense of 
the word, but in the sense of either differences de re (i.e., as lack of uniformity in the real world) or 
differences de signo (i.e., as the lack of uniformity between at least two signals). For our purposes 
here, data are taken as differences de signo. Examples include a higher or lower charge in a battery, 
a variable electrical signal in a telephone conversation and even the presence or absence of noise on 
a communication line (Floridi 2011, pp. 85–86). 
Second, instructional information is nonempty, well-formed and meaningful data that if satisfied 
through unambiguous action yield a particular outcome within a system in a given context. Put 
differently, well-formed and meaningful data carry instructional information i within a system S iff 
when S acts in accordance with i under the right conditions, S systematically performs an action in a 
way that depends on the structure of i. This shows that S can process two types of data: one is the 
“raw” data acted upon and the other is information that instructs S how the former has to be 
processed. The latter must be structured, whereas the former can be either structured or unstructured 
(for more details, see (Fresco and Wolf 2014)). Importantly, the structure of instructional 
information exists in concert with other “raw” data: at least some structure in the overall collection 
of input data is required for specific data to carry instructional information (Fresco and Wolf 
unpublished-a).  
Third, we note that whilst a single datum seems, at first blush, unstructured, in the context of 
computational systems, it is structured. Indeed, when two or more data exist, there is the potential 
for a non-reflexive relationship obtaining amongst those data, whereas a single datum can only have 
reflexive relationships. Yet, a single bit is all that is required, for example, to issue either a stop or 
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resume command within S. And if a single bit can carry instructional information, on the definition 
above, it ought to be structured. We stipulate that a single datum is trivially structured. This sort of 
stipulation is akin to defining an entity with zero symbols as a string, namely the empty string: the 
simplest case is defined in such a way as to allow for consistent treatment (Fresco and Wolf 
unpublished-a). 
Instructional information is prescriptive rather than descriptive: the execution of an action is 
neither true nor false. Hence, it cannot be straightforwardly qualified as true or false. One might 
argue that ‘satisfied instructional information’ is tantamount to ‘true instructional information’. This 
claim, however, is misguided. The conflation of ‘being-satisfied’ and ‘being-true’ may certainly 
result from viewing the satisfaction of instructional information as singling out the set of possible 
worlds in which the relevant state of affairs obtains (Hamblin 1987, p. 152). For example, the 
instruction ‘turn off the air conditioner’, call it Stop-AC, is satisfied in those worlds in which the air 
conditioner is turned off. Yet, the air conditioner being turned off could be the result of a power 
outage, for example, rather than the recipient of Stop-AC executing the necessary action (turning off 
the AC) to achieve the particular outcome (the AC is stopped). Neither the instruction nor the action 
Stop-AC prescribes is straightforwardly alethically-evaluable. Rather, instructional information is 
either effective or ineffective depending on the contextual success criteria. 
Computational systems that have at least two capacities (typically) require instructional 
information to single out the action to perform. “[T]he characteristic purpose of imperatives is to 
influence choice. It is futile to tell [...] anyone to do something [...] he cannot help doing” (Hamblin 
1987, p. 145). The selection between these capacities is enabled by instructional information. A 
capacity is an action a system, whether abstract or physical, can reliably and systematically execute 
under the right conditions. Thus characterised, the distinction between trivial and nontrivial 
computational systems can now be articulated. A nontrivial computational system has at least two 
capacities and it selects between them by processing instructional information in a way that 
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systematically depends on the structure of that information (for a discussion on exceptions to this 
rule see (Fresco and Wolf unpublished-b)). A trivial computational system, on the other hand, has 
only one capacity: it is capable of only one action, and, therefore, need not process instructional 
information. 
A critic might argue that actions, too, are observer-relative in a manner akin to computation2. 
Any given system can be viewed as performing any number of actions in several ways that go 
against our intuitive individuation of actions. There are four cases that result from the 
synchronic/diachronic and one-to-many/many-to-one distinctions. In the diachronic/one-to-many 
case, the same action (e.g., jumping or relaying high voltage only if all inputs are high voltages, call 
it RHV) that is performed at two different times could also be viewed as two different actions (first 
jump and second jump or first RHV and second RHV). In the diachronic/many-to-one case, an 
action (e.g., jumping or RHV producing low voltage) followed by another action (e.g., running or 
RHV producing high voltage) could instead be viewed as a single action (e.g., exercising or 
ANDing). (Similar examples can be constructed in the case of synchronic identity.)  
The individuation of actions that potentially gives rise to an unlimited proliferation of actions has 
been discussed in the literature at length (for a discussion, see, e.g., Mackie (1997)). As is well-
known, the act of a man moving his arm, thereby operating a pump, which pumps poisoned water in 
the house’s water supply, thereby poisoning the inhabitants can be described as multiple or a single 
action(s). But actions can instead be individuated in terms of their results, and their spatiotemporal 
and causal properties can be determined by the properties of the results. By adopting an act-
individuation principle according to which actions are identical iff they have the same results, the 
unlimited proliferation of actions can be avoided (Mossel 2001, pp. 258, 264). Poisoning the 
inhabitants is a result of the replenishing of the water supply, but an effect, rather than a result, of 
the man moving his arm. Similarly, the data processing actions underlying trivial and nontrivial 
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computations are individuated in terms of their data (and possibly information) processing results 
(e.g., low voltage output or transitioning into a new state). 
Let us consider a few representative cases of trivial and nontrivial computational systems 
showing the delineation between classes of computational systems. Standard two-input, one-output 
Boolean gates are trivial computational systems, because they operate on unstructured data3 and 
have only one capacity. Neither input bit of an AND-gate, for example, has any special role in 
determining the action of the gate. No ordering relation need be imposed on the data processed: 
swapping the order of the input bits still yields the same output. The AND-gate has a single 
capacity, which is to perform logical conjunction whenever two input data are present.  
Next, we consider computational systems that process structured data. The input data to an n-bit 
adder, for example, are structured: the 0th bits are separate from the 1st bits and so on. It is, 
therefore, more computationally powerful than standard two-input, one-output Boolean gates. Still, 
it only performs trivial computation, as it only has a single capacity, which does not require 
instructional information to be exercised. An arithmetic logic unit (ALU), which is capable of more 
than one operation, say, addition and conjunction, is a nontrivial computational system, for it 
processes instructional information. Instructional information is required for the ALU to select 
between the two operations to perform. (In the next section, we qualify this characterisation of the 
ALU.) All the preceding cases are memoryless systems.  
The next level of complexity is that of memory-based computational systems, such as flip-flops, 
finite state automata (FSAs), Turing machines (TMs) and physical instantiations thereof. These 
systems process instructional information in performing computation, but they are also capable of 
retaining their state (e.g., a flip-flop is the most basic computer memory cell) and their present state 
affects their next state. In memory-based computational systems, their memory model implies a 
structure to the data they process (Fresco and Wolf 2014). At each step of a TM computation, for 
example, the combination of the scanned symbol (being structured data) and the state of a 
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(deterministic) TM uniquely determines the capacity to be exercised next. This combination is 
instructional information, the processing of which leads to the execution of a capacity of a TM by 
moving from its current memory configuration to another. An FSA is different from a TM in that 
the former has a more restricted set of capacities. The contents of the FSA’s input tape remains 
unchanged in the course of the computation, and the position of its read-only head shifts only to the 
right by exactly one position. 
2.2. A reply to an objection 
A critic might argue that such an account of nontrivial computation relies on a distinction between 
structured and unstructured data that is itself observer-relative. Consider a two-function logic unit 
(FLU) that performs either a logical AND or XOR. Its truth table is depicted in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. A binary truth table of a two-function logic unit capable of AND or XOR.    
 
Under this description (2-FLUAX), the rightmost input-bit (‘In3’) is a control bit: if it is 0, perform 
XOR on the other input bits (‘In1’ and ‘In2’); otherwise, perform AND on those bits. But, arguably, 
the very same truth table can describe a single capacity circuit, and under this description, the 
circuit is a memoryless trivial computational system. This, supposedly, shows that the IIP account 
fails to provide an observer-independent explanation of digital computation. 
Our reply to this objection is that it shows that computational descriptions of some memoryless 
computational systems – rather than memory-based nontrivial computational systems – are observer 
relative.  The same information – or data – processing operations may be used in different ways, 
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giving rise to different “computations” relative to different levels of abstraction (see Floridi 2011, 
Chapter 3).4  The structuring of data is not an intrinsic property of data, rather it is imposed by the 
physical system processing the data. Nevertheless, the underlying computation at the physical level 
remains the same. This is akin to measuring the length of a piece of metal using either a yardstick or 
a metrestick. The two measurements yield different numerical results, but the objective physical 
length of the piece of metal remains the same. 
It is simply the nature of memoryless computational systems that they can be described 
differently by appealing to a single abstract specification of the system, such as a truth table. 
Consider a truth table of an FLU capable of performing either AND or OR (rather than XOR as 
depicted in Table 2), call this description 2-FLUAO. Under this description, the leftmost input bit 
(‘In1’) is a control bit (recall the observation above about structure in the overall collection of input 
data): if it is 0, perform AND on the other input bits (‘In2’ and ‘In3’); otherwise, perform OR on 
those bits. 
 
Table 3. A binary truth table of a two-function logic unit capable of AND or OR.    
 
Here, too, the very same truth table can be used to describe a single capacity circuit that computes 
the 2-threshold function (2-THR): if there are two or more 1s as input, produce 1 as output; 
otherwise, produce 0 as output. 
Prima facie, there is no reason inherent to the truth table description in Table 3 that privileges 2-
FLUAO over 2-THR, or vice versa, as the “correct” description of the computation the circuit 
performs. But, according to the IIP account, by adopting Occam’s razor, we should opt for 2-THR: 
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structure should not be posited when it is not required. 2-THR provides a shorter description of the 
circuit than 2-FLUAO. This is readily demonstrated by observing that the 2-FLUAO description 
requires the introduction of additional (meta-)information, namely the structuring of the data and 
the identification of the control bit, whereas the description of the circuit as 2-THR does not require 
the introduction of any such information.  
Many problematic cases of memoryless computational systems can be resolved elegantly by 
appealing to “shorter-length” descriptions rather than just to “simpler” descriptions, in the spirit of 
Occam’s razor. The advantage of the former is the applicability of Kolmogorov Complexity for 
“large” enough systems in deciding between two given computational descriptions, such as 2-
FLUAO and 2-THR. The simplest amongst competing computational descriptions is determined by 
finding the one whose program-length is shortest (for a detailed discussion, see (Fresco and Wolf 
unpublished-b)). Occam’s Razor demands that we adopt the simpler theory that posits the least 
structure unless there is evidence to the contrary. (Of course, there is no guarantee that the simpler 
explanation is always the correct one.) 
These examples show that some memoryless computational systems can be described as 
performing either trivial or nontrivial computation. A single capacity circuit description is 
preferable over multiple-capacity descriptions, because the former is, generally, shorter. Clearly, 
some computational problems cannot be solved by memoryless computational systems, since they 
require stateful transitions and the storage of data from previous states. In such cases, for the 
implementing physical system to transition from one memory configuration to another where more 
than one possible transition exists, instructional information is required to induce the correct, 
systematic transition. (We elaborate more on this point in Section 4.2.) 
FSAs and TMs, for example, are not subject to the same objection. The truth table describing all 
possible input combinations of an FSA is infinite, whereas a truth table describing, say, a two–
output, one–output Boolean function is finite. An infinite truth table cannot be plausibly described 
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as a single capacity (otherwise, exercising that capacity would require traversing through infinitely 
many paths). It is the finite transition table of the FSA that describes its multiple capacities. For that 
reason, the IIP account classifies FSAs, TMs, flip-flops and conventional digital computers 
objectively as memory-based nontrivial computational systems.5 
3. A Reply to Bold Anti-Realist Pancomputationalism 
With a better understanding of digital computation as a form of information processing we can turn 
to examine the claims concerning the subjectivity of computation starting with bold 
pancomputationalism. The view described here should be distinguished from the computational 
view of the universe, according to which the universe not only has the capacity to implement any 
program, but it actually performs computations all the time (Fresco and Staines 2014). The former 
view is also known as anti-realist pancomputationalism, which is commonly used to argue against 
the Cognitivist position (Dodig-Crnkovic and Müller 2011, p. 154). This anti-realist version of 
pancomputationalism is the target of this article, since it claims that it is the observer’s description 
of a physical object that makes it into a computational one.  
3.1. Background 
According to bold pancomputationalism, every physical object (can be said to) computes every 
Turing-computable function. In arguing against the Cognitivist position, Searle has pointed out that 
the very idea of multiple realisability is problematic for the cognitivist. Whilst the true threat of his 
argument is not pancomputationalism as such, but rather the observer relativity of computation, his 
argument can be taken to support bold anti-realist pancomputationalism. The Searlean 
Pancomputational Thesis may be stated as follows. For any sufficiently complex physical object O 
(that is, an object with a sufficiently large number of distinguishable parts) and for any arbitrary 
program specification P, there exists an isomorphic mapping M from some subset S of the physical 
states of O to the formal structure of P (Searle 1990, pp. 27–28). With the added assumption that 
 12 
such an isomorphism is sufficient for O to realise P, Searle’s result, if it were true, would imply that 
every sufficiently complex physical object computes every Turing-computable function. 
How is this thesis justified? For any physical object to be “sufficiently complex” it simply needs 
to have a sufficiently large number of distinguishable parts. A big enough wall, for instance, would 
do the trick. That wall may then be physically described at a microscopic level specifying some 
movement pattern of some large enough number of molecules. Any arbitrary program, such as 
WordStar, has some specification that describes its formal structure and this structure can be 
implemented by any number of physical substrates as dictated by the principle of multiple-
realisability. “The physics [of the implementing substrate] is irrelevant except insofar as it admits of 
the assignments of 0’s and 1’s and of state transitions between them” (Searle 1990, p. 26). 
What remains to be seen is how M is fixed by the implementation of P. Here Searle was 
(mis)guided by Alan Turing’s analysis of the human computor executing an algorithm. The TM 
goes through the steps of P based on the rules P provides for deriving the output symbols from the 
input symbols. This process is causal insofar as some physical properties of O (implementing some 
FSA or a TM) suffice for O to follow these steps (Searle 1990, pp. 32–33). M maps the states in S 
onto the abstract states of P. Since, by Searle’s lights, M need not be a one-to-one mapping, it 
suffices that only the states in S partake in the mapping from O to P. The requirement that O have a 
sufficiently large number of distinguishable parts supposedly guarantees that such a subset S exists. 
Accordingly, a (large enough) wall is bound to have the right pattern of moving molecules that 
“mirrors” the state transitions of WordStar (or any other P) (Searle 1990, pp. 27–28).  
In a similar vein, Putnam’s Pancomputational Theorem can be stated as follows. There exists a 
physical theory P such that for any ordinary open system6 Κ, an inputless FSA δ, n > 0 (the number 
of computational steps of δ) and for any (divisible) real-time interval I, Κ (describable in P) realises 
n computational steps of δ within I. According to Putnam, Κ realises n computational steps of δ 
within a given interval I of real time, if there exists a one-to-one mapping F from δ’s state types 
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onto physical state types of Κ and a division of I into n subintervals such that for any two states q, p 
of δ the following condition holds: if q → p is a transition of δ from the computational step j to j+1 
(for 0 < j < n) and Κ is in state F(q) during the jth subinterval, then Κ transitions into state F(p) in 
the j+1th subinterval (Scheutz 1999, pp. 166–167). 
How is this theorem justified? Putnam argues that insofar as K has a sufficient number of internal 
states7 it will be a realisation of any FSA. His example is an FSA that transitions between two 
computational states A and B producing the sequence ABABABA. The internal state of K is 
considered at seven points in time (e.g., 12:00, 12:01, … 12:06) yielding seven states s1, s2, … s7. 
Each si is assumed to be caused by si-1. State A of δ may be defined as the disjunction s1 ∨ s3 ∨ s5 ∨ 
s7 (and similarly for B and the remaining states of K). K then implements δ from 12:00 to 12:06 
(inclusive). Crucial to his proof are two assumed principles. The first is the principle of continuity, 
which states that forces, such as electrical and gravitational fields, that may influence Κ are 
continuous. The second is the principle of non-cyclical behaviour, which states that there exists 
some natural clock that constantly stamps the system in such a way that Κ cannot have a duplicated 
physical state and enter the same (maximal) state twice. Accordingly, there are only one-to-one 
mappings of the physical states of Κ to the computational states of δ. For once K transitions out of a 
particular physical state it does not return to that state, due to forces that irregularly perturb Κ. 
Putnam asserts that his proof can be generalised to apply to an arbitrary number of computational 
states and state transitions of an FSA, as well as for FSAs with input. 
3.2. A Reply to Bold Anti-Realist Pancomputationalism 
Neither Searle nor Putnam restricts the physical objects under consideration to computing only 
some Turing-computable functions. As long as the object has sufficient internal physical states it 
may implement any FSA. And since the physical states are chosen arbitrarily (there is no restriction 
on selecting atomic or subatomic particles), any “macroscopically small” object will do. We start 
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with two well-known objections. The first one is the failure to account for counterfactuals (cf. 
(Block 2002; Chalmers 1996; Chrisley 1994; Copeland 1996)). Inherent to Searle and Putnam’s 
arguments are the lack of any constraints on physical state type formation (Scheutz 2012, p. 100) 
but also the ex post facto nature of their computational descriptions.  
The physical states of Searle’s wall or any “clocked” open system are chosen according to the 
computation actually performed. But counterfactuals are important to physical computational 
systems. (Nevertheless, some argue that it would be preferable to dispense with counterfactuals in 
an account of physical computation altogether (Scheutz 2012, p. 81).) Any particular sequence of 
state-transitions is only one (of possibly many) that could have occurred. A computational 
description should also allow all the possible computations, which the system could have 
performed, rather than just the one it actually performs. The more complex the computational 
system is, the more counterfactuals there are. 
The second objection is an undesirable consequence of Searle’s claim that syntax is observer-
relative, rather than intrinsic to physics. The consequence is that even conventional digital 
computers do not compute. Logical 0s and 1s that are typically associated with the operation of 
physical computational systems are not intrinsic to the physics of the labelled states. There are no 
discrete binary states intrinsic to the physics of an iMac, iPhone or IBM’s Jeopardy! player Watson. 
Binary labels are externally assigned according to whether some specific variables, such as voltage 
levels, degrees of magnetisation or the presence/absence of water droplets, fall within one 
predefined range or another. “If the truism that syntax is not intrinsic to physics implies that brains 
are not ‘intrinsically digital computers’ then by parity it implies that no entity is intrinsically a 
digital computer” (Copeland 1996, p. 356).  
A better understanding of digital computation as a form of information (or merely data) 
processing gives rise to two other objections to bold pancomputationalism. Additionally, it 
motivates the computational objectivist view. The claim at the core of these objections is that a 
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finite physical object can only support a finite number of computations simultaneously. The result is 
that bold pancomputationalism cannot be true for finite physical objects. Two similar arguments 
support this claim and the first one can be summarised as follows. 
1. A finite physical object has the capacity to store a finite amount of information8. 
2. Digital computation – as the processing of information – requires storage of information. 
3. Simultaneous distinct computations (also) require the storage of distinct information. 
4. (Therefore, a finite physical object can only support a finite number of distinct computations 
simultaneously.) 
Since the locutions ‘finite’, ‘storage of information’ and ‘simultaneously’ play a key role in the 
ensuing discussion, they require some explication. The notion of finiteness is easiest to demonstrate 
in mathematics and more specifically in set theory. A set is finite if its cardinality is a positive 
integer. For example, the cardinality of {a, b, c, d, e} is 5. The set of natural numbers is 
enumerable, but its cardinality cannot be given as a positive integer. It is, therefore, infinite. 
Finiteness implies not only bounds but also minima and maxima. Whilst the description of a single 
TM is finite, its tape is infinite. The TM’s tape, in principle, has no bounds – it can always be 
extended if needed. After a finite amount of time, the portion of the tape that has been used in the 
computation is always finite. When considering the physical realm, a region of space is finite if the 
set of all distances from its points to some fixed point is bounded. 
Next, we consider the locution ‘storage of information’. We use information storage systems 
every day: dictionaries, telephone directories and computer discs. Each discrete piece of 
information is stored separately, for example, as a dimple on the surface of a computer disc. 
Information is carried and transmitted by signals – or data, so, if it is to be stored physically, what 
needs to be stored is, first and foremost, the underlying data. Since a datum, by our definition, is the 
lack of uniformity between at least two distinct variables, the storing of data has to preserve this 
lack of uniformity. The most basic storage unit of discrete data is a classical bit. In an electronic 
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computer, it is physically realised by a bistable device stabilising on either logical 0 or 1. Very little 
information can be stored in a single bit, so larger amounts of information are stored as collections 
of bits. 
We now proceed to examine the individual premises of the first argument in order. (The third 
locution is explicated below in conjunction with the third premise of the argument.) Putnam and 
Searle’s arguments rely on physical microstates being used in the computations. The physical 
substrate of the object in question (be that matter or fields) serves as a storage medium of 
information. A physical object with 2n possible states can store n classical bits of information.9 
“Space is […] literally just a storage space for information [… that] is naturally associated with 
matter” (Verlinde 2011, p. 5). According to some physicists, information is stored in discrete bits on 
surfaces, rather than in points of a discretised space: the information content of each particle is 
proportional to its surface area (cf. Vedral 2010, p. 190; Verlinde 2011, pp. 5–6).  
In any finite physical system – that is, a system with an effectively finite-dimensional state space 
with some energetic constraint – only a finite amount of information can be stored (Hänggi and 
Wehner 2013). (From a quantum mechanical perspective, the amount of classical information that 
can be encoded in a system is known as Holevo’s bound.10) Any finite region of space can only 
contain a finite amount of matter. And matter can only be subdivided into smaller parts up to a 
limit. There is some minimum size beyond which it cannot be further subdivided. This is 
compatible with Max Planck’s idea of indivisible quanta (Planck 1914). Unless matter is infinitely 
divisible, which is certainly logically possible11, and whatever the minimum size of the elementary 
particles is, it can only store a finite amount of information. 
Construed as a form of information processing, digital computation requires storage of 
information. Here the distinction introduced above between memory-based and memoryless 
computational systems comes in handy. Computation in memoryless systems does not require the 
retention of state and, therefore, does not require a long-term storage of information. A two-input, 
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one-output AND-gate, for example, performs its computation without depending on a previous 
state. Trivial computations only require that the data processed be somehow physically realised by 
whichever particles are available as data storage media. (Trivial computations that operate on 
structured data require additionally that these particles be somehow structured appropriately.) 
However, nontrivial computations further require that instructional information be physically 
realised and be distinguished from “raw” data being operated on. Memory-based computations 
require additionally that their states be stored throughout the course of the computation.  
Consider physical instantiations of a TM and an FSA. The former is the quintessential digital 
computational system storing and deleting information. Whatever computation the TM performs it 
uses its tape for storage. Perhaps, the TM is too easy an example. An FSA clearly computes, but its 
tape is unidirectional and it cannot store information on this read-only tape. Nevertheless, the FSA’s 
tape is used for storing the input data and its states are storage media of instructional information. 
Anything that can be computed by a TM equipped with a finite tape can also be computed by an 
FSA with sufficiently many states. The FSA’s states can be used to store information that the TM 
would store on its read/write tape. 
Bold pancomputationalism entails that every physical object computes every Turing-computable 
function and there are infinitely many TMs, each corresponding to a different algorithm for 
computing a function using a different table of instructions. This brings us to the third premise and 
to the third locution: ‘simultaneous’. It may certainly be true that ‘most conventional digital 
computers instantiate distinct programs simultaneously’ (where at least some portions of these 
programs do not overlap; more is said about this in Section 4). But the truth of this claim depends 
on what ‘simultaneous instantiation’ means. One possible interpretation is that a general-purpose 
computer has multiple distinct programs stored in its memory and each program is executed at some 
point in time but not necessarily all at once. ‘Simultaneous instantiation’, accordingly, could mean 
that all these distinct programs are executed on the computer over its lifetime (possibly, ad 
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infinitum), provided that it is powered indefinitely. On this interpretation, less information storage is 
required. Any particular program requires information storage during its execution, and upon its 
termination – the information can be discarded. 
Nonetheless, bold pancomputationalism implies that every physical object implements infinitely 
many distinct programs simultaneously. If we accept the three premises above, then we should also 
accept the conclusion that follows and reject bold pancomputationalism. Consider a universal TM 
(UTM) that has infinitely many heads and infinitely many (enumerable) tapes (instead of a single 
infinite tape), each of which stores a single TM. Such an idealised UTM can, arguably, support 
infinitely many distinct programs simultaneously. On the other hand, a finite physical object cannot 
support infinitely many distinct programs (or TMs) even given unbounded time (though arbitrarily 
many computations may then be possible by manufacturing more tape when necessary). 
It seems that either way the bold pancomputationalist might respond to this last assertion, she 
faces serious challenges. On the one hand, despite using classical physics, she might grant that 
matter is indeed not infinitely divisible, so there is some minimum unit of information storage in 
Nature. But, then, the argument continues by claiming that there can still be infinitely many TMs all 
operating on the same set of data, perhaps, even cooperatively to a single end. In other words, 
(possibly infinite) storage space could be saved by having those TMs write to overlapping “physical 
regions”. But, for one thing, even by extending the tape of a single TM, the very same TM 
description characterises a computation of the same function over a larger domain (Brown 2012, p. 
62). And bold pancomputationalism implies that infinitely many Turing-computable functions are 
computed simultaneously. Why is there a reason to assume that all these infinitely many TMs 
operate on the same set of data? Neither Searle nor Putnam restricts the set of data that physical 
objects supposedly operate on. Besides, why should all possible inputs to these infinitely many TMs 
be excluded? These infinitely many inputs also have to be physically stored as data for the 
computation. 
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Moreover, the bold pancomputationalist should also account for the storage of the infinitely many 
TMs’ tables of instructions. Every TM clearly has a finite description, but infinitely many of them 
exist. If these (infinitely many) tables of instructions are not somehow stored in the physical object 
performing the computation, then the information about every particular TM algorithm can be 
present only in a complete description of all the possible trajectories of the particles engaged in the 
computation (Brown 2012, p. 63). In other words, bold pancomputationalists ought to provide a 
complete listing of what each TM would do under every possible circumstance (cf. the 
counterfactual objection above). However, that, too, would unavoidably require that a finite 
physical object store an infinite amount of information. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that the bold pancomputationalist rejected the idea that there exists 
some indivisible particle. That would mean that somehow a finite physical object has infinitely 
many particles, each of which can be an information storage unit. But, then, she would have to 
account for the structural stability of the “physical system”, as a functionally related set of “parts”, 
performing the computation. The structural stable “physical system” should be able to recover an 
equilibrium state upon being disturbed by any of the admissible perturbations. (Putnam’s 
pancomputational theorem, for one, is explicitly defined in terms of open systems that are not 
shielded from external forces.) At some point, subdividing a physical system destroys its property 
of being structurally stable. Clearly, resorting to infinitesimally small particles as information 
storage units unavoidably reaches that point. 
Our second argument can be summarised as follows. 
1. A finite physical object has a finite amount of energy. 
2. Digital computation dissipates energy in order to process information. 
3. Simultaneous distinct computations require the dissipation of distinct energy. 
4. (Therefore, a finite physical system can only support a finite number of distinct computations 
simultaneously.) 
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The first premise is motivated by Einstein’s mass–energy relationship in special theory of 
relativity and Planck’s observation on the speed of light. “Since […] energy radiation is propagated 
in the medium with a finite velocity […], there must be in a finite space a finite amount of energy” 
(Planck 1914). Light propagates at a finite speed anywhere and it cannot propagate instantaneously. 
Otherwise, if one assumes that the propagation of energy is variable, one gets a contradiction: some 
parts of the system would receive energy before others via a non-constant light speed (Shour 2008). 
Similarly, from the mass–energy relationship it follows that matter confined within a finite volume 
with a standing structure has a finite amount of energy associated with it. In this context, too, it is 
posited that light has a finite speed of propagation (Bohm 2006, p. 12). 
The justification of the second premise proceeds in two steps: for irreversible and reversible 
computations. An operation is logically reversible if its inputs can always be inferred from its 
outputs. Conversely, a logically irreversible operation is such that in producing an output loses 
information about the history of the operation (i.e., not all inputs may be inferred from the output). 
The ultimate limits of the real-time speed of computational systems (as well as their 
miniaturisation) are governed by unavoidable heat increase through their energy dissipation. There 
is a minimum thermodynamic cost to any computation. This cost is the sum of the energy involved 
in providing the extra bits required in the course of a computation plus the destruction (by erasure) 
of the “garbage” bits produced.12 This erasure operation, and, similarly, the merging of two 
computational paths, is the irreversible part of the computation. According to Landauer’s principle, 
only this irreversible part of the computation dissipates heat. As it turns out, there are upper and 
lower bounds on the ultimate limits of the thermodynamic cost of effective computations (Landauer 
1961; Li and Vitanyi 1992).  
Most conventional computational systems are irreversible. Consider, for instance, an AND-gate 
or an OR-gate that lose information about the history of computation when the output produced is a 
logical 0 or 1, respectively. The loss of information in logically irreversible operations is 
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accompanied by energy dissipation to the surrounding environment as heat. Still, even reversible 
computation is accompanied by some minimum heat dissipation when garbage information is 
erased. Importantly, any finite physical system that computes all infinitely many Turing-computable 
functions will ultimately run out of storage space. That is, of course, assuming that information is 
stored discretely and that the physical media used for storage is not infinitely divisible. Since our 
concern is digital computation, this assumption is not implausible. 
From the three premises above it follows that a finite physical system can only support a finite 
number of distinct computations simultaneously. The third premise is justifiable by the first law of 
thermodynamics: inevitably, computation, as a thermodynamic process, decreases the internal 
energy of the physical object whilst some heat is dissipated to the surrounding environment. The 
upper limit to the number of possible concurrent computations (also) depends on the energy 
footprints  of the particular computations performed. Still, bold pancomputationalists might argue 
that multiple computational tasks can somehow be performed efficiently using the “same” energy 
dissipation, thereby lowering the total energy dissipation. However, they ought to show how 
arbitrary finite physical objects in nature minimise energy dissipation by way of efficient heat 
exchange between different physical objects, preventing heat loss, etc. 
This shows that the bold pancomputationalist can argue for either weak or moderate 
pancomputationalism. Searle’s Pancomputational thesis and Putnam’s Pancomputational theorem 
may threaten the objectivity of computation even if the number of relativistic computational 
descriptions of a given system is neither maximal nor infinite. According to weak 
pancomputationalism, every physical object (can be said to) computes at least one Turing-
computable function. Many physical objects can possibly be described as performing trivial 
computation, for example, as computing Boolean functions on n inputs. (Such computations can be 
performed by  memoryless systems and do not require information storage for their computation.) 
Furthermore, every physical object can be described as implementing a single-state FSA. 
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Nevertheless, the more interesting – but hard to justify – hypothesis would be that these objects are 
nontrivial memory-based computational systems with multiple states. 
The lack of appropriate constraints on physical state type formation simply reinforces the 
question of what counts as a legitimate physical state in (possibly competing) computational 
descriptions (Scheutz 2012, p. 104). Many objects can be described as implementing a two-state 
FSA as long as the physical states describable by the physical theory can be straightforwardly and 
reliably mapped onto one of these two state types. Fewer objects can be described as implementing 
a three-state FSA and so on. According to moderate pancomputationalism, every physical object 
(can be said to) computes more than one Turing-computable function. In the next section, we 
address the matter of multiple computational descriptions given to a single (computational) system 
and what it takes for a system to compute more than one Turing-computable function. 
Moreover, it is one thing to describe the physical system concerned in an arbitrary and ex post 
facto manner. However, it is questionable whether Searle’s pancomputational thesis and Putnam’s 
pancomputational theorem can be upheld in a form of a reliable law-like generalisation. A 
computational state-transition has to be reliable and yet open systems are susceptible to external 
influences where even the slightest perturbation affects the system’s state.  
By way of concluding this section, we briefly respond to a possible objection to the two 
arguments above: the conception of information being used in these arguments is objective and non-
semantic.13 Such conception, so the objection continues, is very different from the semantic 
conception of instructional information used in Section 2. Supposedly, the same physical system 
can be given an infinite number of informational descriptions in the sense of what instructional 
information is processed.  
Our brief reply to this objection is twofold. First, explaining nontrivial digital computation in 
terms of instructional information, which is a semantic notion, does not entail either 1) that there is 
no underlying quantitative/non-semantic conception of information in play or 2) that instructional 
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information cannot be formalised.14 For one thing, instructional information is underpinned by 
structured data. Structured data can be quantified and shown to be different from unstructured data. 
Second, even though instructional information (e.g., in a given data set {d1, d2, d3}) can be any one 
of the data being processed (i.e., any of d1, d2, d3, d1d2, d1d3 or d2d3), it does not follow that there 
exists an infinite number of informational descriptions of the computational system processing that 
information (in our case there are at most six such descriptions). Besides, very few of those would 
be coherent descriptions in consideration of all the valid input/output mappings of the 
computational system concerned. 
4. Multiple Computational Identities 
4.1. Background  
Let us now examine the putative, more modest, claim for the observer-relativity of computation 
stemming from the multiplicity of computational identities of genuine computational systems. The 
argument for multiple computational identities can be summarised as follows. 
1. Some computational systems simultaneously implement multiple computations. 
2. In any given context, the computation performed by a computational system is determined 
by a single syntactic structure, which is the underlying task. 
3. The underlying task is at least partially semantically individuated. 
4. (Therefore, some computation is at least partially semantically individuated relative to one 
particular task that the computational system performs.) 
The gist of the argument is that some physical systems implement more than one syntactic 
structure simultaneously. It appears in (Shagrir 2001) and is originally aimed at computational 
cognitive systems. To determine which syntactic structure constitutes the system’s computational 
identity, some other constraint has to be invoked. Oron Shagrir argues that this constraint is 
semantic: the system’s computational identity is affected by the content of its computational states.  
 24 
We focus here solely on the argument’s implications for the alleged observer-relativity of 
computation and, in particular, on the first premise. An AND-gate can be said to implement either 
conjunction or disjunction (in negative logic) (Bishop 2009, p. 228; Shagrir 2001, p. 374; Sprevak 
2010, p. 269). Similarly, a NAND-gate can be reinterpreted as a NOR-gate and a XOR-gate can be 
reinterpreted as an XNOR-gate by reversing the standard interpretation of logical 0s and 1s. Whilst 
the first premise clearly does not entail either bold or weak pancomputationalism, it does invite the 
question whether the computational identity of the system is observer-relative. 
It should be noted that not all those who endorse the view described here subscribe to the identity 
conditions of computational systems being observer-relative. Shagrir, for one, claims that none of 
the premises of the argument above makes the identity conditions of computational systems 
observer-relative. Rather, he claims that “a physical system may simultaneously implement more 
than one syntactic structure” and it can safely be “assume[d] that all these implemented structures 
are intrinsic [to the system]” (Shagrir 2001, p. 379). On the other hand, Mark Bishop claims that the 
computational function implemented by the physical system must be contingent on the observer-
determined computational-to-physical state mapping used (2009, p. 228). In a similar vein, Mark 
Sprevak claims that even an “appeal to the larger system in which [a computational] unit is 
embedded does not help to determine whether [… it computes] AND or OR” (2010, p. 269). 
4.2. A Reply to Multiple Computational Identities 
A clarificatory question is in order before we proceed. Multiple syntactic structures introduce an 
observer-relativity problem only if 1) they are somehow incompatible, and 2) none of them is 
ontically or epistemically privileged over the others. As already suggested above, computation 
being an observer-relative phenomenon does not follow from a single computational system lending 
itself to more than one description. Arguably, standard conventional digital computers (e.g., those 
using x86 compatible processors) instantiate distinct assembly language programs and higher-level 
language programs simultaneously. Why would some constraint be required to determine the 
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computational identity of the system? 
The argument for multiple computational identities does not centre on a computational system 
simultaneously implementing a program P in, say, Java or C++, as well the same program compiled 
into, say, assembly (call it P’). Thus described, every conventional soft-programmable computer 
certainly implements multiple programs, such as P and P’, simultaneously. Such description is akin 
to a multi-level description of a UTM performing some computation. At one level of abstraction, it 
may be described as executing a particular program on some specific input. At another level, it may 
described as computing, for example, the square root of 80 to 10 decimal places. However, these 
two descriptions do not qualify as two distinct functions computed by the UTM. In that sense, the 
AND-gate being amenable to performing disjunction is a red herring. The argument is better served 
by considering a multi-head/multi-tape UTM that implements many distinct programs (i.e., specific 
TMs) simultaneously. Provided that these programs imply different behaviours and that none of 
them is ontically or epistemically privileged over the others, the computational identity of the 
system is supposedly observer-relative. 
What, then, determines the computational identity of the system concerned? Shagrir lists three 
different ways to describe what a physical computational system, S, does.  
1. A physical description, for example, in terms of the volts flowing through S. 
2. A syntactic description of the abstract structure that S implements, for example, in terms 
of a truth table description of S’ input/output mappings. 
3. A semantic description interpreting the state types of the abstract structure of S (e.g., 
interpreting the symbols ‘0’ and ‘1’ as representing numbers).  
On the received view, the computational identity of S is determined by its syntactic structure, yet 
Shagrir argues that it does not follow from that view that semantic content has no impact on 
individuating S’ computational identity (2001, p. 373). Similarly, Sprevak argues that 
“representational content is a necessary condition that does crucial work in determining 
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computational identity” (2010, p. 261) of physical computational systems, whereas an abstract 
“Turing machine operates on syntactic entities” (2010, p. 269). But it seems curious to insist on 
semantic interpretation as being necessary for establishing the computational identity of S when 
there could be multiple distinct interpretations. Of course, none of these interpretations would 
change the underlying physical working of S. “[T]he computational identity of [the system] is the 
same if we interpret the ‘0’ and ‘1’ as representing numbers, colored hats or shapes” (Shagrir 2001, 
p. 373). 
Rather than S’ computation being determined by some single syntactic structure (being “the 
underlying task” according to the second premise above), it is determined by all the syntactic 
structures that S implements. None of these syntactic structures is either ontically or epistemically 
privileged over the others. Whilst a UTM is an abstract computational system, it serves us well here 
to make our point. Consider again a multi-head/multi-tape UTM, U, that implements many distinct 
programs simultaneously. A complete description of U at any point in its computation can be 
specified by giving the state of its controllers, the contents of all the tapes, and the position of the 
heads on the tapes. Call such a complete description the Instantaneous Description (ID) of U. A 
directed graph consisting of all the possible IDs can be used to represent every possible 
computation performed by U where each vertex in the graph is in one-to-one correspondence with 
an ID (labelled IDx). A directed edge is added from vertex IDx to vertex IDy when the configuration 
specified by IDy follows from IDx via a single move of U. A single vertex (labelled ID0) represents 
the starting configuration of U. Any path starting at ID0 that continues through the graph to some 
vertex IDi with the halt state corresponds to a valid computation U. (For a full description of how 
such configuration graphs are constructed, see, for example, (Adriaans and van Emde Boas 2011, p. 
7) and (Fresco and Wolf 2014).) 
A physical conventional computer can be similarly represented by such a configuration graph 
that can be used to determine the computational identity of the computer at any given time. Each 
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vertex of the corresponding configuration graph represents the total memory configuration of the 
computer (including the contents of all its data storage units) and the state of all its CPUs. (The 
initial state of the computer is represented by the vertex labelled ID0.) Viewed this way, the 
processing of instructional information results in the computer moving from one memory 
configuration to another. The loading of a program into the computer’s memory affects its memory 
configuration, even if the program is not executed. A description of a computational system that 
appeals to its configuration graph depends not only on the syntactic structures implemented by the 
system but also on its physical makeup. 
At the physical level, computation as information/data processing is a systematic manipulation of 
dynamically enforced microphysical state correlations. This systematic manipulation means that the 
way information is manipulated is itself sensitive to the dynamical mechanisms that produce these 
correlations (Bokulich 2013, p. 40). Structured systems arise through a systematic correlation of 
effective degrees of freedom. A degree of freedom is an independent parameter that specifies the 
state of the system at a given time. A single point particle has three degrees of freedom, whilst its 
microphysical state space (displaying both the generalised coordinates and the canonically 
conjugate momenta of the particle) is six-dimensional. Structure reduces degrees of freedom. A 
molecule can do less than its composite atoms can (e.g., by limiting the momentum of some of the 
atoms in a molecule) (Bokulich 2013, pp. 32–33). 
The objectivity of the computational identity of the system is fixed by degrees of freedom at the 
physical level and in memory-based systems the configuration graph can be used to determine this 
identity during runtime. The effective causal dynamical structures that process information are 
observer-independent facts about the computational system that allow an observer to interpret a 
particular system as performing a given computation. The correlation of one microphysical state of 
the system with another allows inferring one microphysical state from another correlated 
microphysical state. In memory-based computational systems, multiple semantic interpretations can 
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be ascribed to a single system only if they are homomorphically equivalent to its configuration 
graph. That is, not only do input/output data need to be fully specified by the semantic interpretation 
concerned, but also every possible transition from one memory configuration to another. The 
configuration graph representation does not apply to memoryless computational systems though, 
such as two-input, one-output Boolean gates. 
Nevertheless, the semantic interpretations that can be ascribed to trivial memoryless 
computational systems are also restricted by the data processing operations performed at the 
physical level. A conventional AND-gate can only be used as a device performing logical 
conjunction on input data due to the particular structure of the gate that limits the degrees of 
freedom of the underlying microphysical states. The same AND-gate can be semantically 
reinterpreted as performing logical disjunction. But this is only because the same microphysical 
state correlation obtained in an OR-gate when the input and output data are interpreted in negative 
logic and ¬(p	 ∧ q) is equivalent to ¬p ∨ ¬q. However, a conventional AND-gate cannot be 
similarly reinterpreted as performing NAND or XOR. 
The semantic interpretation does not fix the computational identity of the system concerned, but 
rather gives the computation a different name. A logical disjunction may very well be called 
conjunction instead (and vice versa), but the computational identity of the Boolean gate is fixed by 
the underlying data processing operations. The corresponding truth table of the gate is merely 
mirrored, whereas the “black box” does not change, only how the input and output data are 
interpreted. “There is [...] an abstraction involved in naming an operation and using it on account of 
‘what it does’ while completely disregarding ‘how it works’” (Dijkstra 1972, p. 11).  
Whilst the Cryptographer’s Constraint may not apply in the case of Putnam’s pancomputational 
theorem, it does apply as a constraint on the semantic interpretations that can be ascribed to some 
computational system. According to the Cryptographer’s Constraint, the larger (or more complex) a 
string of text (or a system) to be decoded is, the fewer nontrivial interpretations of the text there are 
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(Dennett 1989, p. 136, fn. 6). This constraint does not apply to Putnam’s pancomputational theorem 
because of the posited principle of continuity (Chrisley 1994, p. 419 , fn. 9). But it does apply when 
considering nontrivial versus trivial computational systems. 
The distinction drawn in Section 2 between trivial and nontrivial computation elucidates the 
increasing complexity of such computational systems. Two-input, one-output Boolean gates are 
memoryless and their data processing operations are amenable to a simple description. Yet, as the 
complexity of the computational system increases “the chances that there is more than one 
meaningful interpretation for that [… system] decreases drastically” (Chrisley 1994, p. 419 , fn. 9). 
Nontrivial memory-based computational systems are far more complex in that they have multiple 
capacities and require some form of information to determine the next state-transition depending on 
the current state and input read. The more complex the configuration graph of the system is, the 
fewer (interesting) coherent interpretations of the computation there are.  
Lastly, a critic might argue that any instance of an NP-complete problem can be 
translated/reduced to an instance of another NP-complete problem in polynomial time (Hopcroft et 
al. 2001, p. 447 ff). And this shows that any NP-complete problem can be semantically 
reinterpreted as any other NP-complete problem. However, we argue that multiple semantic 
interpretations can be correctly ascribed to a single computational system only if they are 
homomorphically equivalent to its configuration graph. The homomorphic equivalence requirement 
is, strictly, more restrictive than what is required of a reduction of one NP-complete problem, N, to 
another, M. The latter requires that the input(s) to and output(s) of the algorithm for solving N be 
translated to the corresponding ones in M (e.g., translating Boolean clauses in N to vertices on 
graphs for M). But such reduction does not require, for example, that the instance of N and instance 
of M be of exactly the same input size. 
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5. Conclusion 
We conclude that, at least to a large extent, computation is an objective phenomenon. Construed as 
a form of information/data processing, the effective dynamics of the computational system have to 
maintain the structures that realise the information. The structure of the data and the system 
processing them guarantees the correlation amongst the effective microphysical states. We have 
argued that information-processing considerations determine what type of computation takes place 
in physical systems. Some genuine computational systems may indeed be semantically interpreted 
as performing “different” computations. This is certainly the case for some trivial computational 
systems. But, in the case of nontrivial computation, it becomes increasingly harder to ascribe them 
multiple coherent interpretations as their complexity increases. Besides, the computational identity 
of the system remains fixed even though all these semantic interpretations are equally “correct”. We 
have also argued above that bold anti-realist pancomputationalism does not hold in finite physical 
objects. The result was weakening pancomputationalism to the claim that a finite physical system 
can only support a finite number of computations simultaneously. 
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Notes: 
1 Some have called this view unlimited pancomputationalism claiming that it is the strongest version of 
pancomputationalism (Piccinini 2012). But the strongest version of pancomputationalism is the view that the universe is 
a computer (Dodig-Crnkovic and Müller 2011, p. 153). 
2 I thank an anonymous referee for this critique. 
3 There are four two-input, one-output gates that process structured input data. 
4 For a similar argument in the context of defending the mechanistic account of computation see (Dewhurst 2014). 
5 It may be argued that there exist some weaker FSAs and TMs (e.g., a single-state FSA) for which an indeterminacy 
argument can be constructed thereby showing that the IIP account cannot treat all these systems uniformly as memory-
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based nontrivial computational systems. For a detailed discussion of the memory model in such systems in a generalised 
meta-computational space see (Fresco and Wolf 2014).  
6 The expression ‘ordinary open systems’ refers to systems that are open to influences, such as gravitational and 
electromagnetic forces, and constantly change. 
7 An internal state of Κ is defined as a set of K’s maximal states (a maximal state is a complete specification of the 
values of all the relevant variables of Κ) for some given real-time interval (e.g., from 13:00 to 13:04) such that these 
maximal states correspond to the automaton’s states in a single run of δ. 
8 This argument can be reformulated in terms of data, rather than information, since the underlying data are those used 
to carry information. For ease of exposition it is formulated in terms of information. 
9 Interestingly, although quantum mechanics provides for a significant improvement over classical mechanics in the 
efficiency of communication, arguably, “the transmission of n quantum bits cannot serve to communicate more than n 
classical bits of information” (Brassard 2003, p. 1611). 
10 I thank an anonymous referee for emphasising the quantum mechanical perspective. 
11 If matter and time are infinitely divisible, then it is possible to perform infinite computations in finite space and time. 
12 Garbage information is an intermediate memory that is used to keep track of the history of the computation going 
from state sx to sy but is not otherwise used for the computation itself. 
13 A related critique might be that the information a physical state carries is observer-relative. But the critic will have to 
concede that the sum of all actual or possible attributions is finite. 
14 cf. Peter Corning’s (2001, pp. 1280–1281) proposed framework for quantifying “control information” in relation to 
its capacity to control and utilise available energy and matter in or by a cybernetic system. 
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